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Abstract: This article assesses methods and tools deployed by the Commission to ensure 
compliance in the environmental sector. This assessment is made using Tallberg’s theoretical 
interpretation of enforcement and management strategies within the EU. The author analyses the 
statistical data provided in the Commission’s annual reports on monitoring the application of 
EU law, as well as environmental infringement judgments delivered between 2007 and 2013. 
This examination of the environmental policy area and sources for non-compliance validates the 
complementary deployment of both strategies as they offer a variety of preventive and coercive 
measures. However, the analysis demonstrates that the Commission uses the management 
approach more effectively to ensure compliance in the environmental policy area. Although the 
Commission is making progress under the enforcement approach in the field of the 
environment, its potential has not been fully realised without a more rigorous application of 





The issue of compliance with EU law is a matter of perennial debate. It has been analysed both 
by political scientists and lawyers trying to identify reasons for non-compliance and to assess 
methods of improving compliance in the EU.1 The main focus of legal research has been on 
enforcement mechanisms, in particular the infringement procedure which is seen as the primary 
vehicle in ensuring compliance with the EU acquis. Compliance records vary depending on the 
policy area, although some policy areas, such as transport, environment, internal market and 
services, and justice, have long standing poor records. As the European Commission releases its 
latest 31st Report on Monitoring the Application of EU Law, it is again apparent that the 
environment remains an area of concern when it comes to the implementation of EU law. 
Despite a downward trend in the overall number of infringements from 2007 to 2013, the 
number of environmental infringement cases rose in 2013.2 By the end of 2013, 1300 
infringement cases remained open and of these 334 were environmental infringements, 
representing 26 per cent of the total.3  
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Does this indicate poor rule conformance in this policy area and a sluggish response by the 
European Commission? This article will assess methods and tools deployed by the Commission 
to evaluate their effectiveness in reducing non-compliance in the environmental sector and 
identify the comparative effectiveness of those tools. This will be done by using Tallberg’s 
theoretical interpretation of enforcement and management within the EU.4 This broad approach 
best explains the Commission’s role in ensuring compliance by bringing together the 
management and enforcement strategies. In examining compliance with international regulatory 
agreements, Tallberg challenges the conception of enforcement and management as competing 
strategies for achieving compliance. Tallberg tests this approach by looking at the centralised and 
active system of supervision conducted by the EU institutions and the decentralised system of 
supervision which relies on courts and individuals to alert the Commission of cases of non-
compliance. He also examines the sources of non-compliance which necessitates the 
complementary use of the two strategies.    
 
Tallberg’s approach is particularly relevant in examining compliance with the EU environmental 
acquis as this policy area encompasses a wide range of issues and requires member states to incur 
costs and put in place complex legislative and administrative systems. This requires a 
comprehensive approach which brings together all EU institutions, member states and citizens 
and provides a variety of preventive and coercive measures. The paper assesses compliance at 
the centralised level with the Commission at the forefront as “guardian of the Treaties” as this 
system still remains the primary vehicle of compliance in this policy area. Both under the 
management and enforcement umbrella at the central level, the Commission successfully 
included citizens’ perspectives into its approach to environmental compliance and addressed the 
negative perception of the Union as “an affair of the élites”.5 By empowering citizens and 
various public interest groups to participate in the decision-making process and supporting 
compliance by submission of complaints, the Commission made centralised enforcement more 
appealing for wider public groups than resorting to the private enforcement mechanism. As 
Harden argues, a complaint to the Commission has a number of advantages as compared to 
bringing proceedings in national courts, including no cost to the complainant and no need for a 
specific interest in the infringement, which is of special importance in environmental cases.6 No 
less important for the environmental policy area is the Commission’s expert knowledge required 
to make the scientific and economic appraisals necessary to identify certain infringements when 
national courts are not in position to do so.7 
 
The paper argues that, while the complementary nature of the enforcement and management 
strategies identified by Tallberg improves compliance in this policy area by addressing various 
causes of non-compliance, management strategies deployed by the Commission are more 
effective in supporting compliance. First, the paper will explain Tallberg’s approach to 
compliance and identify how methods and tools used by the Commission fit within this. Second, 
the paper will apply Tallberg’s interpretation of enforcement and management strategies to the 
environmental policy area and assess if the Commission’s approach enables compliance in this 
policy area. The author will use information and data provided in the Commission’s annual 
reports on monitoring the application of EU law and statistical data available on the DG 
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Environment website from 2007 to 2014. Finally, the paper will examine the sources of non-
compliance in this policy area by analysing all environmental infringement judgments delivered 
between 2007 and 2013.8  
 
2. What is the Commission’s approach to compliance? 
 
The issue of compliance in the European Union has warranted significant scrutiny due to the 
fact that, unlike in member states, compliance is reliant on a greater number of actors, 
institutions and processes. Pressman and Wildavsky’s point that “the longer the chain of 
causality, the more numerous the reciprocal relationships among the links and the more complex 
implementation becomes” is particularly relevant in the EU context.9 Despite the fact that the 
EU, as a supranational institution, faces challenges ensuring compliance, Tallberg recognises that 
it effectively employs a combination of management and enforcement strategies to induce 
compliance.10  
 
Under the enforcement approach, states are seen as rational actors which are incentivised to 
comply by the likelihood of detection through monitoring and the threat of sanctions.11 
According to Tallberg “monitoring and sanctions constitute the two central elements of this 
strategy”.12 Monitoring ensures transparency, while the risk of sanctions potentially raises the 
costs of non-compliance. Unlike many international regimes, the EU successfully developed the 
infringement procedure under Article 258 TFEU (ex 226 EC) as the main mechanism for 
enforcing EU law. Initially, this procedure lacked effectiveness as the Court of Justice (ECJ) was 
not given the power to impose financial penalties. This was changed with the Maastricht Treaty 
which introduced the procedure for sanctioning member states under Article 260 TFEU (ex 228 
EC). Tallberg recognises that within the formal framework of the infringement procedure, both 
the enforcement and management processes are used both to put pressure on member states and 
to incentivise compliance as an attractive option.13  
 
Under the management approach, Tallberg argues that non-compliance is best addressed 
through a problem-solving strategy of capacity building, rule interpretation and transparency.14 
States’ receptiveness to the management strategy may be explained by the fact that non-
compliance is not necessarily a deliberate decision to breach a provision but rather is a result of 
capacity limitations or legal vagueness and ambiguity of rules. From a theoretical perspective, the 
distinction between the enforcement and management approach provides an explanatory model 
that allows assessing the Commission’s tools for compliance according to two particular 
methodologies. This is not the case with some other methodologies used to assess compliance 
that primarily focus on national adaptation by member states to the EU acquis rather than 
analysing the Commission’s approach to compliance.15  
 
Smith takes a similar approach to Tallberg by departing from a traditional view of infringement 
procedure as a single function provision and perceives Article 258 TFEU as a multi-functional 
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mechanism.16 This work considers the role of Article 258 TFEU in the context of good 
governance and the quest for greater legitimacy in the EU.17 According to Smith, Article 258, as 
a centralised enforcement mechanism, has many different functions including the constitutional 
mechanism of enforcement, compliance and integration; executive policy choice; a forum for 
citizen and institution interaction; an administrative and regulatory tool and an institutional 
forum for debate, control and accountability.18 Although Smith focuses solely on Article 258, she 
also recognises several features of this mechanism, some of which may be regarded as examples 
of the management approach as put forward by Tallberg.  
 
Which methods and tools are used by the Commission and can they be placed within the 
enforcement and management approaches? Although its main enforcement tool is the 
infringement procedure under Article 258 TFEU prescribed by the founding EEC Treaty, the 
Commission recognised the importance of management strategies as the most appropriate 
method to support enforcement in its quest for compliance. In its 21st Annual Report on 
Monitoring the Application of Community Law, the Commission concentrated on management 
tools by identifying ways of improving the pre-litigation procedure.19 Such improvements 
included: strengthening of contacts between the Commission and member states; providing 
better information to citizens in a more systematic manner; bilateral meetings of national experts 
with the Commission services to discuss transposition issues before directives have to be 
implemented; better use of guidelines and interpretative texts developed by the Commission; 
establishment of rapid inter-service contacts before the adoption of new directives; as well as 
other ways of ensuring better transparency in the process of implementing and applying EU 
law.20  
 
The complimentary nature of the enforcement and management strategies was discussed within 
the wider context of remedying the democratic deficit facing Europe in the wake of the Laeken 
Declaration on the Future of the European Union.21 As a way of involving citizens and 
organisations in shaping and delivering EU policy, the Commission proposed a set of measures 
to achieve better policies, regulation and delivery in its White Paper on European Governance.22  
This advocated an interaction of strategies that could be classified as either management or 
enforcement encompassing the use of different policy tools, simplification of existing EU 
legislation, publication of guidelines and use of expert advice and more vigorous pursuit of 
infringements committed by member states.23 The importance of this policy document is that it 
combines the two approaches not only as a way of ensuring compliance but also mitigating the 
democratic deficit in the EU.24 
One of the landmark documents recognising the two-track approach is “A Europe of Results – 
Applying Community Law” published in 2007.25 Still, if we look at the areas of improvement 
highlighted in the policy document, the Commission increasingly deployed the management 
strategy as being more effective.  As a result of growing difficulties of applying Community law 
in a progressively diverse EU, the Commission recognised prevention by devoting increased 
attention to implementation through the policy cycle and the efficient and effective information 
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exchange and problem-solving as examples of the management approach. Although it falls 
within the infringement procedure as the main enforcement vehicle, the Commission placed an 
emphasis on management measures by prioritising cases that require a more immediate response 
by the Commission. The final measure was the enhancement of dialogue with citizens and other 
EU institutions in all stages of implementation which encompasses both the enforcement and 
management approaches.  
In 2008 the Commission prepared a special policy document addressing the implementation of 
European Community environmental law where it demonstrated how the new tactic set out in 
“A Europe of Results – Applying EU Law” applied in this policy area.26 The Commission 
focused mainly on the management approach as the most beneficial mechanism to improve 
compliance records within the context of a more transparent and effective inter-institutional co-
operation and communication with the public. Prevention of breaches throughout legislative and 
post-legislative activities occupied an important place in this complex and wide ranging policy 
area. The Commission emphasised its preference for problem-solving as a management tool 
mechanism to respond to specific concerns of the European public. More immediate and more 
intensive treatment of important infringements was recognised as a management measure albeit 
with the aim of improving the enforcement approach of the Commission. The focus on 
management tools in this policy area is best explained by the need to apply the relevant 
environmental acquis “to a wide range of natural conditions” and in different national and 
administrative structures.27  
 
Unlike all previous policy documents, the most recent document on “Better Governance for the 
Single Market” places a greater focus on the enforcement approach and reiterates a zero 
tolerance policy of the Commission when it comes to non-implementation of the EU internal 
market acquis.28 As the internal market acquis encompasses the regulation of goods and services it 
directly impacts the environmental policy area. Even though the document recognises various 
management measures such as setting up informal contacts with national officials and expert 
groups as an important part of the policy-making process, the Commission reiterates its 
prerogative to “use its enforcement powers with utmost vigour” and calls on member states to 
cooperate more effectively to that end.29 This sudden change of heart may be explained by high 
expectations from the Commission to use Article 260 more effectively for imposing financial 
penalties which was amended by the Treaty of Lisbon with the aim of improving compliance.  
 
3. An Examination of the Environmental Policy Area 
 
The environmental policy area was always identified as one of the most challenging areas for the 
implementation of the EU acquis as it encompasses a wide range of issues such as air and water 
quality, water protection, waste management, climate change, GMOs, soil protection, nature and 
biodiversity, chemicals and environmental impact assessment. This is reflected in the number of 
infringement cases; the environment features as one of the areas with the highest number of 
infringements.30 This has put enormous pressure on the Commission to deploy both 
management and enforcement strategies to address a plethora of different causes of non-
compliance. This raises a question of the extent to which those strategies ensure compliance, as 
well as their relative effectiveness when compared to each other. As Tallberg points out, the 
principal means of ensuring rule conformity at the centralised level is a system “whereby EU 
institutions hold states responsible for their violation but also attempt to improve their capacity 
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to comply”.31 This is not an easy task for the Commission as it continuously faces two main 
operational challenges; the scale of policies and insufficient resources to police the EU more 
effectively. Smith points out some improvements made in regard to the environmental policy 
area. From 1997 to 2007, the internal resources the Commission deployed to prosecuting 
environmental infringements have far outweighed similar resources deployed in the internal 
market sector.32 In addition, DG environment is one of the few DGs with a unit specifically 
responsible for infringements.33  
 
3.1. The Commission’s Management Approach to the Environment  
 
Under the management approach, Tallberg argues that non-compliance is best addressed 
through a problem-solving strategy of capacity building, rule interpretation and transparency.34 
He points at four prominent strategies. First, the EU uses economic funds to enable adjustment 
to EU rules. Second, the Commission negotiates transitional periods with new acceding 
countries to give them time to make necessary adjustments. Third, the Commission tries to close 
knowledge gaps by fostering cooperation with national authorities. Finally, the Commission 
issues interpretative guidelines in certain policy areas as necessary.  
 
The enforcement approach was conceived in the founding treaties through the infringement 
procedure as the main vehicle of ensuring rule conformity. However, the Commission quickly 
understood the financial, administrative and legal implications of the environmental acquis on 
member states and promptly embraced the tools under the management approach in this policy 
area as more effective. This is evidenced by the wide use of financial instruments under the 
management umbrella to enhance compliance with the EU environmental acquis. LIFE is 
regarded as a central EU financial instrument covering environmental, nature conservation and 
climate action projects.35 It was launched in 1992 and has been implemented through four cycles 
so far.36 Since 1992 4,171 projects were financed through this programme amounting to 
approximately €3.4 billion euros for the protection of the environment.37 The priorities set out in 
the EAP and thematic strategies are reflected in each LIFE programme phase and the 
Commission ensures that selected projects are in line with the EAP’s objectives. In addition, 
structural and cohesion funds are also significant for the environment, despite the fact that they 
fall under the umbrella of regional policy.38 Regional policy has evolved over time to provide 
significant assistance through these funds. Between 2007 and 2013, the total amount of structural 
and cohesion funds allocated to environmental programmes has doubled since the previous 
period to around €100 billion and now constitutes 30 per cent of the total.39 No less important is 
CAP, which underwent several reforms as it had become unsustainable in its original form and 
gradually became greener.40 An example of this change was the Single Farm Payment System 
where direct support to farmers is subject to the principle of cross-compliance, which means that 
                                                 
31 See fn.4, pp. 614-615 
32 See fn.16, p. 125 
33 See fn.16, p. 136 
34 See fn.4, p. 613 
35 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/life/index.htm 
36 LIFE I: 1992-1995, LIFE II: 1996-1999 and LIFE III: 2000-2006; LIFE+ IV: 2007-2013, 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/life/about/index.htm#history  
37 See fn.35  
38 the European Regional Development Fund, the European Structural Fund and Cohesion Fund 
39 http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/presenta/working2008/work_en.pdf p. 16 
40 See S. Hix and B. Høyland, The Political System of the European Union, 3rd edn (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011)  
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farmers must comply with public health, animal and plant health standards; environmental 
standards and animal welfare standards in order to receive payments from CAP.41 
 
The management approach has proven very successful in addressing environmental issues in the 
accession process. Transitional periods for environmental acquis are an inevitable reality in the 
accession negotiations. The Commission regularly negotiates transitional arrangements with 
states acceding to the EU, providing them with sufficient time to adjust to new behavioural 
requirements.42 As practical implementation and enforcement require development of “necessary 
administrative, technical and scientific infrastructure to protect and improve the quality of the 
environment”43 and the obligation to apply laws and policies in a decision-making process, 
national authorities find implementation a demanding, complex and costly task. As each 
accession country is expected to adopt all laws and put in place required administrative or judicial 
procedures by the date of accession,44 the EU, in certain circumstances, allows transitional 
measures which should be “limited in time and scope”45. Transitional measures are the most 
numerous for the environmental acquis and almost all countries that joined the EU requested a 
wide range of transitional measures which were incorporated in the accession treaties.46 The 
biggest challenge so far was the accession of the ten countries in 2004 and the two remaining 
central and eastern European countries in 2007, when gloomy scenarios about the effects of 
their membership on EU environmental policy were put forward due to the various differences 
between the old and new member states.47 The practice of negotiating transitional periods was 
more recently confirmed during the accession of Croatia, which negotiated a wide range of 
transitional measures concerning the environment.48  
 
Capacity-building and rule interpreting are prominent strategies to ensure rule conformity 
concerning the EU environmental acquis. The use of these management tools is even more 
significant for the environment as this policy area encompasses many various sectors and relies 
on scientific evidence and technology. The Commission recognised the need to assist member 
states throughout the whole policy cycle. One of the first measures is to work closely with 
member states during the transposition period and provide member states with sufficient 
guidance. To that effect, the Commission uses “transposition implementation plans”, which 
represent an “inventory and planning of protective measures to take during the transposition 
measures”.49 Those plans include transposition checklists; interpretative transposition aide 
memoires and guidelines and peer-reviewable transposition scoreboards.50  
 
The Commission also holds regular meetings with national authorities and provides support for 
networks and expert groups such as the European Union Forum of Judges for the 
                                                 
41 Art. 5 of the Council Regulation (EC) establishing common rules for direct support schemes for farmers under 
the common agricultural policy and establishing certain support schemes for farmers, amending Regulations (EC) 
No 1290/2005, (EC) No 247/2006, (EC) No 378/2007 and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003, OJ L30 
42 See fn.4, p. 615 
43 J. McCormick, Environmental Policy in the European Union, (Palgrave, 2001), p. 135 
44 SEC(97) 1608, p. 9 
45 Guide to the Negotiations(2002), Directorate-General Enlargement, p. 67 
46 See Annexes V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, XI, XII, XIII and XIV of the Treaty of Accession of the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia (2003), OJ L 236;  Annexes VI and 
VII of the Treaty of Accession of the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania (2005), OJ L157 
47 See Petr Jehlička & Andrew Tickle, “Environmental Implications of Eastern Enlargement: The End of 
Progressive EU Environmental Policy?”, Environmental Politics, (2004)13:1 and J. Birger Skjærseth and J. 
Wettestad “Is EU enlargement bad for environmental policy? Confronting gloomy expectations with evidence”, 
(2007) 7 Int Environ Agreements, pp. 263–280 
48 Annex V of the Treaty of Accession of Croatia (2012), OJ L112 
49 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/law/compliance.htm  
50 See fn.49 
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Environment51 and the European Union Network for the Implementation and Enforcement of 
Environmental Law (IMPEL)52. Rule interpreting represents a valuable tool in the 
implementation of the EU environmental acquis. As the legislation often introduces concepts 
different to those in national jurisdictions and may be at times highly technical, the Commission 
issues interpretive guidelines to avoid ambiguity among national authorities. Those guidelines are 
prepared for all environmental policy areas, though special attention is given to areas where the 
infringements are more prominent (see Figure 5) such as waste management, water quality, 
nature protection, REACH and environmental impact assessment.53 In addition to guidelines, 
the Commission issues digests of the ECJ’s acquis in certain policy areas recognised as 
challenging for implementation.54 
 
3.2. Infringement procedure – Bringing together the Management and Enforcement Approach 
 
If a member state fails to comply with the EU environmental acquis, compliance can be enforced 
by instituting an infringement procedure under Article 258 TFEU.55 This procedure is a hybrid 
which benefits from the complementary nature of management and enforcement approaches. 
The former approach involves the use of management tools to improve monitoring and problem 
solving mechanisms in the pre-litigation stage before instituting an infringement proceeding 
through an EU pilot, as well as in the administrative phase of Article 258 TFEU encompassing 
informal contacts with the member state concerned, a letter of formal notice and a reasoned 
opinion. The latter approach entails monitoring and imposition of sanctions which requires both 
an analysis of the judicial phases of Article 258 and Article 260 TFEU. However, an examination 
of the infringement proceeding demonstrates a greater effectiveness of the management tools 
deployed by the Commission to support compliance within the infringement procedure.  
 
The Commission monitors compliance with EU environmental rules through its own in-house 
monitoring system. It developed several management tools to that effect. These include the 
practice of collecting national reports sent by member states in fulfilling reporting obligations as 
part of the transposing process and database management systems for monitoring the transposal 
of directives.56 The Commission also compiles reports and prepares comprehensive statistical 
data on the implementation of the EU environmental acquis which is available on the DG 
Environment website.57 The use of these tools improved the Commission’s capacities to 
investigate breaches of EU environmental acquis on its own initiative evidenced by the high 
number of identified infringements in this policy area. In 2013 the Commission identified 199 
environmental infringements which is significantly less than in 2012 and 2011 when the 
Commission identified 386 and 376 infringements respectively.58 However, compared to data 
from earlier years, in particular 2010 when the Commission identified 190 infringements in all 
policy areas, it can be argued that the Commission’s management approach is more effective.59  
                                                 
51 http://www.eufje.org/index.php/en/  
52 http://impel.eu/about/ 
53 E.g. Guidance document on the Waste Framework Directive and Guidelines for the establishment of the Natura 
2000 network in the marine environment;  
54 Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) of Projects - Rulings of the Court of Justice 2013 and Nature and 
Biodiversity Cases - Ruling of the European Court of Justice 2006 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/law/cases_judgements.htm  
55 See more about the infringement procedure in environmental cases in S. Grohs, “Article 258/260 TFEU 
Infringement Procedures: The Commission Perspective in Environmental Cases” in Compliance and Enforcement of EU 
Law, edited by M. Cremona, (Oxford University Press, 2012); 
56 See fn.16, p. 113 
57 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/law/statistics.htm  
58 See fn.2, p. 9; See also COM(2013) 726, p. 7 and COM(2012) 714, p. 7 




The Commission also successfully empowered citizens, businesses and NGOs to provide it with 
information about the state of the environment. A good illustration is the use of national 
inventories of Important Bird Areas (IBA) compiled by a non-governmental organisation, 
Birdlife International, when the necessary scientific information provided by Member States is 
lacking.60 In time, better engagement with citizens on the wider identification of infringements 
resulted in a high number of complaints submitted by citizens, various social groups and 
business which have an important investigative function in this policy area. To that effect, the 
Commission developed a central registry (CHAP ) for recording received complaints and a 
special complaint form for complex and technical areas such as nature.61 
 




In 2013 the highest number of complaints was filed against Italy and Spain63 and concerned 
nature protection, water quality and protection, waste management and environmental impact 
assessment.64 This corresponds not only to environmental sectors identified with the highest 
number of infringements (Figure 5), but also to member states committing the highest number 
of infringements.65 The activism of citizens and social groups confirms the high priority of the 
environment in the EU and the importance of citizens’ perspectives as a part of the centralised 
enforcement system. According to the Special Eurobarometer on the environment, 95 per cent 
of interviewed European citizens cherish the environment as an area personally important to 
                                                 
60 SEC(2010) 1143, p. 170 
61 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/law/complaints.htm  
62 The table was compiled based on data available in the Commission annual reports on monitoring the application 
of EU law. No data were available for 2014; there are also no comprehensive data for the period from 2007-2010. 
http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/applying-eu-law/infringements-proceedings/annual-reports/index_en.htm   
63 In 2013 out of 471 complaints against Italy, 64 concerned alleged environmental infringement, while in case of 
Spain it was 65 out of 439 complaints.  
64 See fn.2, p. 7 




them.66 The only drawback with complaints submitted by individuals and, to a lesser extent by 
NGOs, may be the quality of complaints focusing on individual incidents rather than systemic 
breaches by member states.67 This requires an in depth examination by the Commission which is 
always short staffed for these purposes. Nonetheless, the data suggest that individual complaints 
are of reasonably good quality as indicated by the Commission’s willingness to proceed. For 
example, in 2012 Commission received 588 environment complaints and decided to process 512 
cases, whereby in time it closed 293 cases and transferred 131 to EU pilot discussions with 
member states.68  
 
Over time, the Commission has also developed stronger ties with the other EU institutions. The 
European Environment Agency, which is seen as the most natural partner and ally, gathers and 
disseminates information about the state of the environment to the Commission. Likewise, the 
Commission’s improved dialogue with the European Parliament through petitions and questions 
is not only an important source of information but also a sign of inter-institutional support for 
Commission efforts to ensure compliance. For example, in 2012 the Commission initiated two 
infringement cases and 22 EU pilot discussions with member states following questions and 
petitions from the European Parliament.69 In 2013, the Parliament informed the Commission 
about several important breaches by Italy concerning EU rules on industrial emissions, 
compliance with the polluter-pays principle and compliance with the Environmental Impact 
Assessment Directive.70  
 
Another example of the effective use of the management approach is demonstrated by the wide 
use of problem solving mechanisms in the environmental policy area. As EU environmental law 
is becoming more complex and the number of member states is rising, there has been greater 
focus on resolving disputes in the pre-litigation stage before launching an infringement 
procedure. One of the mechanisms extensively used is the EU Pilot, both in regard to 
complaints confirmed by the Commission and in regard to its own initiative cases. This 
negotiation instrument was introduced by the Commission and several volunteer member states 
in 2008 and it represents a first step in resolving issues with member states concerning the 
application of EU law within a short deadline of 20 weeks.71 It is used by the Commission to 
inform a member state about potential legal and factual problems arising from the 
implementation of the EU acquis and to clarify them at an early stage. In June 2012 two further 
member states, Malta and Luxembourg joined the scheme. This mechanism found extensive 
usage in cases of environmental infringements compared to other policy areas. 
 
Figure 2: EU Pilot Investigations in 2013 
 
                                                 
66 Special Eurobarometer 416, Attitudes of European Citizens towards the Environment, 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_416_en.pdf.  
67 See more in B. Jack, “Enforcing Member State Compliance with EU Environmental Law: A Critical Evaluation of 
the Use of Financial Penalties”, (2010) 23(1) Journal of Environmental Law, pp.73-95 
68 COM(2013) 726 (complete report), p. 55 
69 See fn.68, p. 55 
70 See fn.2, p. 8 





Source: EU Pilot72 
 
Of the 1,502 investigations launched in the EU Pilot between January and December 2013, 
26 per cent concerned environmental issues, making it the leading policy area within this EU 
scheme.73 The highest number of cases also related to the environment from 2010 to 2012.74 In 
2013, the highest number of EU pilot files was opened with Italy (147), Spain (107) and the UK 
(89) and involved bilateral discussions regarding the application of the EU environmental acquis, 
in particular nature acquis, waste acquis and violations of environmental impact assessment 
obligations.75 The success rate of this mechanism is consistently high from 2011. In 2013 the 
success rate was 74 per cent, in 2012, 75 per cent and in 2011, 88 per cent.76 In 2012, several 
important environmental cases were closed on non-communication or inadequate application of 
major pieces of EU environmental acquis including Waste Framework Directive, Packing Waste 
Directive, Directive on Electrical and Electronic Waste, Environmental Impact Assessment 
Directive and Directive on Strategic Environmental Assessment.77 
 
The comparative effectiveness of the management approach is also evidenced by the use of the 
problem-solving mechanism as a part of the formal infringement procedure under Article 258 
TFEU. As Tallberg points out, “dispute settlement is primarily viewed as clarifying common 
                                                 
72 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/scoreboard/performance_by_governance_tool/eu_pilot/index_en.htm#main
contentSec1 accessed on 15 December 2014 
73 Followed by 14 % cases concerning justice, fundamental rights and citizenship, 13 % related to mobility and 
transport, 8 % related internal market & services and 7 % concerned taxation and customs union; 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/scoreboard/performance_by_governance_tool/eu_pilot/index_en.htm#main
contentSec1 
74 See fn.68; See COM(2012) 714 and COM(2011) 588.   
75 See fn.72  
76 See SWD(2014)358, p. 40; See fn.68, p. 55; See COM(2012) 714 (complete report), p. 51. Success rate in 
environmental policy area are not available before 2011.  
77 See fn.68, p. 55 
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norms through interpretation and adjudication, rather than providing enforcement”.78 If a 
member state fails to resolve the issue at the pre-litigation stage, the Commission will resort to a 
formal infringement procedure by sending a letter of formal notice and a subsequent reasoned 
opinion. The highest number of letters of formal notice and reasoned opinions in 2013 
addressed to member states concerned the environmental acquis.79 As the disclosure of any of the 
documents relating to the investigative procedure is not permitted while an infringement case is 
ongoing, it is DG Environment practice to regularly publish press releases containing more 
information on the status of the procedure and the type of environmental infringement.80 It also 
informs citizens of its intention to refer the case to the ECJ or to ask the Court to impose fines 
on member states that failed to comply with a delivered judgment under Article 258 TFEU. This 
‘name and shame’ strategy can certainly enhance compliance before the case is referred to the 
ECJ.  
 
The statistical data indicate reasonable success due to the Commission’s approach in encouraging 
the use of problem solving management strategies within the infringement procedure. There is a 
steady downward trend in open infringement cases which signifies a positive outcome in trying 
to reach an agreement with the member state before the case is referred to the ECJ (Figure 3). 
The sudden surge of cases in 2013 and, to a lesser extent, in 2014 is explained by more new 
directives requiring transposition by 2013 than in previous years.81 However, there are certain 
limitations in using the data provided by the Commission in its annual reports. As the 
Commission changed its methodology in presenting the data on application of the EU law from 
2011, it is often challenging to identify certain data consistently from 2007 to 2013. Likewise, 
there is also an occasional discrepancy between the environmental data presented in the 
Commission’s annual reports and the same type of data available on the DG Environment 
website.82 
 
Figure 3: Open DG Environment Infringements (end of each year)83 
 
                                                 
78 See fn.4, p. 614 
79 See fn.2, p. 11 - In 2013, out of 761 letters of formal notice 223 concerned environmental infringements followed 
by 94 in regard to transport and 69 in regard to health issues, while 52 reasoned opinions out of a total of 217 
concerned the environment. 
80 See http://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/law/press_en.htm  
81 74 in contrast to 56 in 2012. See fn.2, p. 3 
82 See for example the data on the number of open infringement cases in 2013 and 2014 on the DG Environment 
website (http://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/law/statistics.htm) and Commission’s annual reports). See L. 
Conant in Compliance and Enforcement of EU Law, edited by M. Cremona, (Oxford University Press, 2012);  







If the matter of environmental dispute is not resolved through bilateral discussions with member 
states, the case is referred to the ECJ and the Court delivers the judgment under Article 258 
TFEU. In the last three years, the rate of compliance improved and there a slight decrease in the 
number of cases of member states failing to comply with the decision delivered under Article 
258 TFEU.84 However, these findings do not apply equally to the environment; member states 
tend more often not to comply with a judgment under Article 258 TFEU in this policy area than 
would be the case in other policy areas. This is usually the case with ‘laggards’ such as Italy, Spain 
and Greece which have less impressive compliance records.85 Member states make a decision not 
to comply with the ECJ’s judgement in this policy area as it gives them more time to adjust to 
new rules and practices until the Commission decides to launch the procedure under 260 
TFEU.86 
 
Statistical data collected by DG Environment demonstrate some changes in compliance by 
certain member states. Those data help in identifying defaulting states with the highest number 
of environmental infringements and are published annually with the intention of encouraging 
member states to improve their compliance record. Although Borzel argues that non-compliance 
with EU environmental acquis is not a ‘southern problem’, as there is a substantial variation not 
only between states but also between different policies within states, the statistical data speak in 
favour of more prominent southern laggards including Italy, Spain and Greece, with Italy in the 
lead.87  Likewise, France, Belgium, Ireland and Poland are frequently identified as countries with 
a worrying number of environmental infringement cases.88 Still, the Commission’s approach to 
                                                 
84 See fn.2, p. 13 - At the end of 2013, it is estimated that 113 judgments passed under Article 258 had not been fully 
complied with by the member states concerned. There were 128 cases in 2012 and 77 in 2011; See fn.68, p. 9 and 
COM(2012) 714, p. 10. 
85 See fn.65 
86 In Commission v Ireland (C-374/11), the Irish government emphasised that time available to enact the legislation 
must be taken into account by the Court when imposing a penalty and that the time available to comply with the 
judgment under Article 258 TFEU was not sufficient.  
87 TA. Borzel, “Why there is no 'southern problem'. On environmental leaders and laggards in the European 
Union”, JEPP, (2000) 7(1) 
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compliance since 2007 has had varying success in member states, as Figure 4 demonstrates. 
Countries are divided between ‘improvers’ (with a decreasing linear trend in the number of 
environmental infringement cases) and ‘non-improvers’ (those with an increasing linear trend). 
For example, Italy, as one of the member states with the highest number of environmental 
infringements, is the biggest improver over time having had 60 cases in 2007 and 18 in 2014. 
Other laggards such France and Ireland also reduced the number of infringement cases. Leaders 
such as Sweden and Finland have been consistently low over time. A promising avenue for 
further research would be an exploration of the reasons for the discrepancy in improvement 
between member states.  
 








IT -5.12 SE 0.05 
IE -4.77 AT 0.15 
UK -2.74 DE 0.15 
FR -2.45 SK 0.24 
MT -2.43 CY 0.30 
LU -2.36 EL 0.55 
PT -2.05 PL 0.62 
ES -1.83 SL 1.15 
LT -1.81 BG 1.24 
EE -1.67 RO 2.40 
CZ -1.52 
  DK -1.30 
  BE -1.19 
  NL -0.81 
  LV -0.69 
  HU -0.56 
  FI -0.14 
   
However, the enforcement approach demonstrates certain weaknesses which make it less 
effective in ensuring compliance. One of the important variables is the length of time taken by 
the infringement procedure as member states take this into account when making a decision not 
to reach an agreement with the Commission during bilateral discussions. Effectively, member 
states are buying time as they know that the Commission will close the case at any point of the 
proceeding before the ECJ delivers a judgement, provided that a member state carries out 
measures to comply.  
 
In cases of direct actions, which includes the infringement procedure, the average time taken was 
20 months between 2010 and 2014.90 In 2013, the duration of proceedings increased significantly 
to 24.3 compared to 16.7 months duration in 201091, though minor improvements were made in 
2014.92 According to Kramer’s analysis of environmental policy covering the period from 1992 
                                                 
89 The table was compiled based on data available on the DG Environment website 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/law/statistics.htm 
90 Court of Justice of the European Union, Annual Report, 2014, p. 108 
91 See fn.90, p. 108 
92 20 months 
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to 2005, the average duration of the infringement procedure in environmental cases was 19 
months.93 These results do not even take into account the duration of the pre-litigation 
procedure including the dispatch of the letter of formal notice and the reasoned opinion.94 
According to the Commission’s data in 2007 “it takes an average of 19 months to close a 
complaint before a letter of formal notice is sent; 38 months when a case is closed between the 
letter of formal notice and reasoned opinion; and 50 months when the case is closed after the 
reasoned opinion and before the case is sent to the Court”.95 This certainly shows that the 
Commission and the ECJ are not expeditiously dealing with infringement cases and the duration 
of the proceeding remains of the Achilles heel of the enforcement approach.  
Another weakness in regard to the enforcement approach relates to poor application of the final 
avenue to remedy non-compliance by using Article 260 TFEU. This proceeding enables the 
Commission to enforce subsequent compliance with the Court decisions delivered under Article 
258 TFEU. The advantage of this procedure is the possibility of imposing a financial penalty on 
the defaulting member state. The number of Court judgments under Article 260(2) TFEU is 
slightly higher in cases related to the environment. In 2014, the Commission asked the Court to 
impose fines on certain member states in two instances.96 In 2013, four environmental cases 
were referred to the Court under Article 260(2) TFEU and two out of four Court judgments 
delivered in the same year concerned the environment.97 In 2012, two out of three delivered 
judgments again were related to the environment, involving non-compliance with the Waste 
Framework Directive and the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive.98  If those results are 
compared to data from 1998 to 2007, when the Court imposed six fines in all policy areas, we 
can see that the Commission is making strides, though the higher number of penalties imposed is 
expected in this policy area as most of the infringements concern the environment.99   
Furthermore, the use of Article 260(3) TFEU introduced in the Lisbon Treaty did not improve 
the enforcement approach significantly as it is rarely used in this policy area. In the last three 
years, there has been a sluggish initiative of the Commission to use this mechanism to ensure 
prompt transposition of environmental directives despite the commitment made in the 2011 
Communication to use this new instrument more effectively.100 This may be explained by the 
Commission’s reluctance to impose additional financial strains on member states in an area that 
already requires investment of significant resources for the transposition of environmental 
directives. In 2011, there were only two cases of referrals to the Court under 260(3) TFEU 
against Poland for the non-communication of national measures for transposing directives on 
ambient air and marine strategy framework,101 while in 2012 the Commission referred Bulgaria, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia to the court, proposing financial penalties for ‘late transposition’ 
of the Waste Framework Directive.102 In 2013 no referrals were made under Art 260(3) TFEU in 
regard to the environmental acquis.103 The lack of pressure on member states also aligns with the 
                                                 
93 Ludwig Krämer, “Statistics of Environmental Judgments by the EC Courts of Justice”, J Environmental Law 
18(3) (2006) 407, p. 413 
94 See fn.93, p. 413 
95 See fn.25, p. 5 
96 C-167/14 and C-557/14; Three judgements were delivered in 2014 under Article 260(2) TFEU. See Commission 
Staff Working Document “Monitoring application of EU law in EU policy areas, pp. 62-72 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/applying-eu-law/infringements-proceedings/annual-reports/index_en.htm  
97 SWD(2014) 359, p. 38 and p. 42 
98 SWD(2013) 433, pp. 24-25 - Commission v Ireland (C-279/11) and Commission v Ireland (C-374/11)  
99 See fn.16, p 128; see also P. Wennerås “Sanctions against Member States under Article 260 TFEU: Alive, but 
Kicking?” (2012) 49 CMLR p. 145. – He states that only 14 cases have been brought before the ECJ under 260 
TFEU from 1993 to 2012.  
100 Communication from the Commission — Implementation of Article 260(3) of the Treaty, OJ C 12, 15.1.2011 
101 SWD(2012) 400, p. 8 
102 See fn.68, p. 55 
103 See fn.97  
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new Commission’s post-austerity agenda to further stabilise national economies and boost jobs 
growth and investment.104 
 
4. Non-compliance with the EU Environmental Acquis 
 
In order to demonstrate enforcement and management as complementary strategies to induce 
compliance, Tallberg explores sources of non-compliance. He argues that “non-compliance in 
the EU can best be explained by incentives for defection associated with national adjustment to 
EU rules, and legislative and administrative capacity limitations in the member states”.105 Thus, 
the use of the preventive and coercive measures seems to be the ideal approach to ensure rule 
conformity. As the environmental policy area encompasses many different sectors it is important 
to examine if these same reasons explain non-compliance and if there are any reasons specific 
only to this area. This is also an opportunity to assess the effectiveness of each strategy in 
addressing those sources of non-compliance in the environmental policy area.  
 
The infringement procedure is initiated when a member state ‘has failed to fulfil an obligation 
under the Treaties’ which may include several distinct types of breaches in any environmental 
sector. The highest number of infringements in 2013 concerned the waste acquis, followed by 
water and nature acquis infringements. In its policy document on implementing European 
Community environmental law in 2008, the European Commission identified several 
environmental sectors as particularly challenging, including problems of illegal landfills, urban 
waste water treatment, gaps in a key network of European nature sites and compliance with 
environmental assessment.106 Breaches in relation to industrial installations, air pollution and 
climate change were recognised as other challenging environmental segments.107 Statistical data 
from 2007 to 2014 demonstrate notable improvements in regard to nature and water protection, 
although this does not include the problem of treatment of urban waste water (Figure 5). The 
latest 4th Report Water Framework Directive (WFD) explains this improvement by the active use 
of management tools by the Commission, involving improved dialogue with the member states 
with the aim of clarifying WFD requirements and proposing the best tools for its 
implementation.108 The nature sector benefited significantly from the use of LIFE financial 
instrument which assisted member states in drawing Prioritised Action Frameworks under 
Article 8 of the Habitats Directive.109 Reasonable progress can also be identified in regard to the 
environmental impact assessment, despite the slight increase in 2014. Unfortunately, waste non-
compliance rose sharply in 2012, although compliance has improved from 2013.  
 
Figure 5: Infringements by Environmental Sector110 
 
                                                 
104 See Jean-Claude Juncker, A New Start for Europe:  My Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic 
Change, Political Guidelines for the next  European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/about/juncker-
commission/docs/pg_en.pdf; 
105 See fn.4, p. 623 
106 See fn.26, pp. 3-4 
107 See fn.26, pp. 3-4 
108 COM/2015/0120, pp. 3-4 
109 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/life/news/newsarchive2015/june/index.htm#PAFs  






The most significant breaches in the environmental policy area involve non-communication of 
infringements, incorrect transposition and the insufficient application or enforcement of the 
environmental acquis. Although non-communication is defined as a “failure of a member state to 
notify legislation which transposes a specific directive before a deadline given in a directive”111 or 
“missing or partial notifications of directives’ national transposition measures”112, this is a 
misleading definition as this failure may also include absolute failure to transpose a directive. 
Since non-communication is especially significant in the environmental policy area as directives 
represent the most frequent source of EU environmental law, it would be more appropriate to 
make a clearer distinction between the two types of breaches in the Commission reports and data 
published by DG Environment. This would allow the Commission to use enforcement tools 
more forcefully by deploying Article 260(3) TFEU in cases of non-communication of national 
transposing measures.  
 
Incorrect or incomplete transposition is another type of infringement presented on the graph as 
“non-conformity” cases, while inadequate application and enforcement are presented as “bad 
application” cases. More effective management of non-communication and non-conformity 
cases is recognised as a priority for the Commission as “they present the greatest risks, 
widespread impact for citizens and businesses”.113 Although there is a slight increase in the 
number of late transposition cases in 2013 compared to previous years, there is a general 
downward trend in non-communication and non-conformity cases from 2007.114 The slight rise 
in 2013 and 2014 was triggered by a greater number of new directives to implement from 
                                                 
111 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/law/statistics.htm  
112 Sn fn.68, p. 64 
113 See fn.25, p. 9 
114 478 new late transposition cases infringements were launched in 2013 compared to 447 procedures in 2012; See 



















2013.115 Less visible results can be noted for inadequate application of EU law. Still, overall 
results confirm the effective complementary use of both the enforcement and management 
strategies.  
 





4.1. Sources of Non-Compliance  
 
In assessing the effectiveness of the complementary use of management and enforcement 
strategies, Tallberg divides sources of non-compliance in two groups. First, non-compliance as a 
preference looks at the behavioural adjustments imposed on member states by EU rules.117 If a 
member state has to make significant legal and behavioural adjustments, then the expectation of 
full compliance will be reduced. Second, non-compliance may result from capacity limitations 
and they can include a great variety of potential restrictions.118 Can we identify the same sources 
of non-compliance concerning the environment that would justify the two-track approach 
pursued by the Commission? Can we also assess their comparative effectiveness to this end? An 
analysis of all environmental judgments delivered from 2007 to 2013119 validates the same 
reasons for non-compliance which are more likely to be expected in the environmental policy 
area as the requirements for behavioural, legal, administrative, financial and other adjustments 
are higher in this sector. However, this analysis also reveals some additional sources of non-
compliance caused by the complexity and technical nature of the environmental acquis.  
 
Non-compliance as a preference seems like a rational choice in this policy area. The explanation 
lies in costly legal and institutional adjustments required by the environmental acquis, especially in 
                                                 
115 See fn.2, p. 3 
116 The table was compiled based on data available on the DG Environment website 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/law/statistics.htm 
117 See fn.4, p. 626 
118 See fn.4, p. 626 















sectors such as waste120 and water121. Interestingly, non-compliance as a preference in this policy 
area is also caused by a need to make behavioural adjustments that would lead to changes in 
widely rooted social traditions amongst the general population in certain member states.122 
Finally, the deliberate choice not to comply is often seen in the application of new rules.123  
 
Capacity limitations as another recurrent source of non-compliance are even more prominent in 
relation to the environmental acquis. Constitutional structures in decentralised member states 
such as Belgium124, Spain,125 and Italy126 and are often invoked as a reason for non-compliance. 
Likewise, gaps in internal coordination and external coordination within the wider context of 
capacity limitations are quite common in the environmental policy area and relate both to 
centralised and decentralised member states. Insufficient technical knowledge can also be 
regarded as another capacity limitation that delays the implementation of a very technical 
environmental acquis.127 
 
Beside those two main categories of non-compliance, as recognised by Tallberg, the 
environmental policy area generates other reasons that may render the process of rule 
conformity more complex. The Commission may have disagreements with member states on 
scientific knowledge and how scientific findings should be applied in certain instances.128 Non-
compliance in a significant number of environmental cases is also caused by frequent 
disagreements over the meaning of certain terms or clarity and precision of a provision which 
may cause misinterpretation or misunderstanding of certain directives. This equally applies to all 
environmental sectors and to all member states.129 The understanding of a provision leads to 
another issue of how best to implement certain environmental provisions. Finally, compliance in 
the environmental policy area often depends on the priority given to what a member state may 
consider an overriding public interest.130 
 
                                                 
120 Typical examples are Italy (C-283/07; C-297/08; C-196/13 and C-323/13) and Greece (C-512/09; C-600/12; C-
378/13; C-677/13). 
121 There was an overwhelming number of cases related to water acquis from 2007-2013. See for example C-85/07; 
C-147/07; C-233/07; C-264/07; C-335/07; C-390/07; C-438/07; C-516/07; C-351/09; C-481/09; C-526/09; C-
276/10; C-301/10; C-458/10; C-565/10; C-297/11; C-366/11; C-403/11; C-151/12; C-193/12; C-237/12; C-
23/13; C-85/13; C-356/13; C-395/13; C-190/14; 
122 An interesting example is Malta which at the time made a conscious decision not to make behavioural 
adjustments concerning hunting policy as this would necessitate changing a long standing culture of hunting 
(Commission v Malta C-76/08); A similar issue was raised in a case against Italy where the Italian government 
emphasised cultural and gastronomic traditions in Veneto which may have been jeopardised by the prohibition of 
hunting under the Birds Directive (Commission v Italy C-164/09). 
123 Shortly after the expiry of the transposition periods the Commission launched significant number of proceedings 
for a failure to transpose the Environmental Liability Directive – see C-331/08; C-328/08; C-330/08; C-402/08; C-
417/08; C-422/08.  
124 See C-271/07; C-265/10; C-366/11 
125 See C-403/11; C-151/12 
126 See C-573/08 
127 See  Commission Italy C-68/11 
128 It is also quite striking that non-compliance due to divergent opinions on the use of science is most prominent in 
cases which Commission launches an action against environmental leaders such as Sweden or Finland. See 
Commission v UK (C-390/07); Commission v Sweden (C-438/07); Commission v Finland (C- 335/07)  
129 For example what falls within the definition of a combustion plant under Directive 2001/80 in C-346/08 
Commission v UK; interpretation of “dismantling information” and “striping” under the Directive 2000/53/EC in 
Commission v France C-64/09. One interesting question that arose in regard to implementation of the acquis in UK and 
Ireland was the extent to which environmental directives may be transposed by case-law in common law systems as 
the Commission opposed the idea that this would be acceptable form of transposition - See Commission v Ireland C-
427/07, Commission v Ireland C-50/09 and Commission v UK C-530/11. 
130 This is often the case with the nature and EIA acquis where the certain activities may affect flora and fauna. See 
cases Commission v Spain C-404/09. 
20 
 
What does this tell us about the Commission’s efforts in deploying management and 
enforcement strategies and are they effective in addressing the reasons for non-compliance in the 
environmental policy area? Rational choices of member states not to comply undoubtedly 
question the effectiveness of the enforcement approach. One of the best illustrations is the 
implementation of the Urban Waste Water Directive where we can identify a steady and 
significant number of environmental infringements against almost all member states.131 Even 
though the deadlines for transposition of the directive have long expired, member states make 
rational choices not to comply with the directive as the implementation of this directive is 
demanding due to financial and planning costs related to major infrastructure investment such as 
sewerage systems and treatment facilities.132 In the case of Portugal, three judgments have already 
been delivered on matters related to urban waste water treatment and Portugal was referred for 
the fourth time to the ECJ in 2014.133 If we compare this with the statistical data on imposition 
of sanctions it is clear that costs of timely compliance outweigh the potential costs of non-
compliance embodied in sanctions. In 2013 the Commission recognised the need for capacity 
building to comply with this directive and EU funds were put at the disposal of several member 
states through Cohesion Fund and European Regional Development Fund to allocate to those 
regions lagging behind in implementing this directive.134 It remains to be seen if this management 
approach will prove more successful in ensuring compliance that the enforcement approach in 
regard to the Urban Waste Water Directive.  
 
This demonstrates that the enforcement approach did not live up to its full potential which calls 
for a more rigorous approach by the Commission. Most importantly, this should entail more 
vigilance in using Article 260(2) and (3) as evidenced by its poor application in this policy area. 
That said, there may be questions about the justification of using a penalty under Article 260(3) if 
a member state failed to notify the Commission of a national measure for transposition which 
may be examined on another occasion. Wennerås also points out at the doctrine of general and 
persistent (GAP) infringements as another powerful tool developed by the Commission to tackle 
certain types of infringements more effectively and in a more systematic manner 135 This new 
doctrine, initially developed in the environmental policy area is especially valuable for the 
environmental acquis as many directives require member states not only to put in place legal and 
administrative frameworks but also to ensure continuous application and enforcement of those 
provisions such as the Water Framework Directive and the Waste Framework Directive.136 The 
enforcement approach would also benefit from expediting the infringement procedure as, at the 
moment, member states make a choice not to comply and buy time to make required 
adjustments. Finally, if a ‘name and shame’ strategy is to be regarded as sanction within the 
enforcement process, it would have to carry an actual reputational penalty for a member state, 
though this may be difficult to enforce.  
                                                 
131 Council Directive 91/271/EEC concerning urban waste-water treatment, OJ L 135 
132 See COM/2013/0574; See Commission v Portugal C-233/07; Commission v Sweden C-438/07; Commission UK C-
390/07; Commission UK C-301/10; Commission v Portugal C-526/09; Commission v France C-23/13; Commission v Spain 
C-343/10; Commission v Italy C-565/10; Commission v Italy C-85/13; Commission v Belgium C-395/13 
133 C-530/07; C-526/09 and C-220/10; More on the fourth referral at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-
815_en.htm  
134 COM(2013) 0574, p. 10 
135 Pål Wennerås. “A New Dawn for Commission Enforcement under Articles 226 and 228 EC: General and 
Persistent (GAP) Infringements. Lumps Sums and Penalty Payments”, (2006) 43 Common Market Law Review, p. 
61 
136 One of the recent examples was the failure of Italy to fulfil obligations under the Urban Waste Water Treatment 
Directive in two separate cases Commission v Italy C-565/10 and Commission v Italy C-85/13 where at least one of the 
GAP conditions was met. This is a dimension of scale where failure occurred in a great numbers of localities 





Does this mean that the management approach is more effective in addressing sources of non-
compliance? In regard to cases of non-compliance as a preference for member states, the 
Commission quite successfully uses the management approach to alleviate required adjustments. 
This is certainly true for former accession countries from Central and Eastern European which 
benefited extensively from transitional periods and accession funds to this end. If we assess their 
compliance by comparing the list of transitional measures and the number of infringement cases 
brought against those member states for failing to comply with those measures after the expiry 
of a transitional period, we can see that compliance records are impressive. Only in two cases has 
the Commission initiated the infringement proceedings for failing to comply with directives, for 
which Slovenia and Malta were granted transitional periods.137  
 
Another testament to the effectiveness of dialogue as the main management approach tool 
within the infringement procedure is the significant number of “cases removed from the ECJ 
register” in the period from 2007 to 2013 which usually means the case has been settled to the 
Commission's satisfaction after the application to the ECJ has been made.138 This will include 
both cases where member states make a conscious decision not to comply and cases where this 
is not the result of a deliberate decision. In most instances, the member state has agreed to do 
what the Commission required, while in a smaller number of cases the member state persuaded 
the Commission that there is no infringement or its interpretation of the law in question is 
incorrect or the Commission decided not to pursue the case for political reasons.139 The 
Commission dealt reasonably well with cases of capacity limitations, which is evidenced by a 
negligible number of cases where member states invoked the lack of technical knowledge or 
disagreed with the application of science to environmental policy.140 Still, a management 
approach must be reinforced to prevent cases of rule ambiguity which tend to occur quite 
frequently in this complex and technical area. Some of those cases may be explained by still 
unresolved expert resource issues within the Commission. 
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks  
 
As the environmental policy area is still identified as one of the most challenging areas for the 
implementation of the EU acquis, it was relevant to assess the compliance paths and the 
Commission’s approach in inducing compliance. The latest report on monitoring the application 
of EU law indicated a rise in the number of environmental infringements cases, whereby a total 
of 1300 infringement cases remained open and of these 334 were environmental infringements, 
representing 26 per cent of the total.141 The assessment was undertaken by using Tallberg’s 
interpretation of enforcement and management strategies as it offers a broad approach to assess 
the Commission’s role in ensuring compliance. This brings together the management and 
enforcement strategies to ensure rule conformity and interaction with other EU institutions, 
member states and citizens. It also provides an explanatory model that allows an assessment of 
the Commission’s tools for compliance according to two particular methodologies.  
 
                                                 
137 Commission v Slovenia C-49/10; Commission v Malta C-252/08  
138 Although it is impossible to identify environmental cases the number of overall settled cases is impressive. In the 
period from 2007 to 2013, 249 cases were settled to the Commission’s satisfaction.  
139 See A. Dashwood and R. White, “Enforcement Actions under Article 169 and 170”, (1989) 14 ELR 388; J 
Mertens de Wilmars and IM Verougstraete, “Proceedings against Member States for Failure to Fulfil their 
Obligations” (1970) 7 CMLR 385 
140 See fn.127 
141 See fn.2, pp. 11-12. 
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The examination of the environmental policy area and sources for non-complication validates 
the complementary deployment of both strategies as it offers a variety of preventive and coercive 
measures. However, the analysis demonstrates that the Commission uses the management 
approach more effectively to ensure compliance in the environmental policy area. Under this 
approach the Commission uses tailor made measures to address a wide range of reasons for non-
compliance such as legal, administrative and financial adjustments by member states, capacity 
limitations and rule ambiguity. Likewise, by engaging citizens, NGOs and business in informing 
the Commission about potential infringements, this approach justifies the efforts of the 
Commission ‘to bring the EU closer to its citizens’. Despite the fact that Commission is making 
some strides under the enforcement approach in the field of the environment, the potential of 
this approach has not been fully realised. Without a more rigorous application of Article 258 and 
imposition of sanctions under Article 260, compliance is exposed to risk as member states often 
make rational choices not to comply. More effective use of those mechanisms and more 
expedient procedure would a good way to start.  
 
 
Annex 1: List of environmental infringement cases from 2007-2013142 
 
Austria  C- 535/07; C-401/08; C-422/08; C-548/10; C-352/11 
Belgium  C-93/07; C-271/07; C-100/08; C-342/08; C-258/09; C-513/09; C-538/09; C-36/10; 
C-265/10; C-366/11; C-533/11; C-395/13 
Bulgaria / 
Czech Republic C-378/09; C-481/09; C-276/10 
Cyprus C-340/10; C-412/12  
Denmark C-190/14  
Estonia C-515/09  
Finland C-335/07; C-328/08  
France C-106/07; C-147/07; C-241/08; C-330/08; C-443/08; C-64/09; C-383/09; C-35/10; 
C-395/10; C-515/10; C-193/12; C-237/12; C-23/13 
Greece C-81/07; C-264/07; C-293/07; C-259/08; C-286/08; C-368/08; C-512/09; C-
534/09; C-297/11; C-517/11; C-600/12; C-378/13; C-677/13 
Hungary  / 
Ireland C-427/07; C-188/08; C-279/11; C-374/11; C-158/12; C-50/09 
Italy C- 40/07; C-69/07; C-85/07; C-283/07; C-368/07; C-297/08; C-491/08; C-573/08; 
C-164/09; C-508/09; C-50/10; C-565/10; C-68/11; C-85/13; C-196/13; C-323/13 
Latvia  / 
Lithuania  / 
Luxembourg  C-61/07; C-273/08; C-331/08; C-390/08; C-526/08; C-458/10; C-576/11 
Malta C-76/08; C-252/08; C-351/09 
Netherlands / 
Poland C-46/11; C-192/11; C-356/13 
Portugal C-233/07; C-530/07; C-30/09; C-37/09; C-526/09; C-220/10; C-34/11; C-223/11 
Romania C-522/09 
Slovakia C-331/11 
Slovenia C-402/08; C-49/10; C-365/10 
Spain C-480/07; C-516/07; C-308/08; C-392/08; C-404/09; C-48/10; C-90/10; C-343/10; 
C-403/11; C-151/12 
Sweden C-246/07; C-438/07; C-479/10; C-607/10; C-243/13 





                                                 
142 Except GMOs cases. It also includes cases brought under Article 260 TFEU 
